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Al-Qaeda has had greater success in East Africa and the Horn than
any other part of sub-Sahara Africa. Relative proximity to the Middle
East and a series of local factors account for this situation. Al-Qaeda
carried out the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998 and bombed an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya north
of Mombasa in 2002. Local and international authorities foiled a
number of other al-Qaeda plots in the region. Osama bin Laden had
his headquarters in Sudan from late 1991 until Sudan forced him to
leave in mid-1996. Subsequent al-Qaeda efforts, which were already
well advanced in Kenya and Somalia, tended to emanate from those
two countries. But while acknowledging there is a real al-Qaeda
problem in the region, there is a tendency by the US, a few countries
in the region, and al-Qaeda itself to exaggerate its impact and influ-
ence. This only plays into the hands of al-Qaeda and focuses scarce
US resources primarily on the short-term goal of tracking down al-
Qaeda while reducing attention and resources for dealing with the
long-term reasons why al-Qaeda has been able to function in the
region. Eliminating al-Qaeda is important but it will not be accom-
plished solely by military action against suspected al-Qaeda opera-
tives. It is time to confront this as a long-term challenge that address-
es more effectively its root causes.
Beginning of the Al-Qaeda Threat and Current Strategy
Dissident groups with local agendas have carried out numerous acts of ter-
rorism in East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) and the Horn (Somalia,
Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti) in recent decades. The groups include, for
example, the Janjaweed, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) in Sudan’s Darfur region, the Lord’s Resistance Army in
Northern Uganda, and several that operate against the government in Ethiopia.
Because of the focus in this article, it may give the impression that al-Qaeda-
related terrorism poses the principal terrorist threat in the region. In fact, domes-
tic insurgent groups are responsible for many more acts of terrorism and pose a
greater threat to regional stability than al-Qaeda. The goal here is to provide a
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dispassionate analysis of al-Qaeda activity in the region and not to make a case
for basing policy there almost exclusively on the al-Qaeda challenge.
Nevertheless, the dramatic international terrorist attacks (and failed efforts) by
al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations are cause for concern even if the threat has
been exaggerated by al-Qaeda itself and occasionally countries in the region or
those with interests there. 
It is important to distinguish between international terrorism and what is
often called domestic terrorism. Title 22 of the United States Code defines “inter-
national terrorism” as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than
one country. It defines “terrorism” as premeditated, politically motivated vio-
lence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clan-
destine agents.1 Although there is no universal agreement on the definition of ter-
rorism, these two distinctions effectively distinguish between international and
domestic terrorism. The US is intensely interested in the former, especially ter-
rorism perpetrated by al-Qaeda and its affiliates; it is only marginally interested
in the latter. Leaders in East Africa and the Horn are concerned about interna-
tional terrorism and tend to overstate its impact in order to attract financial assis-
tance and political support but they are more worried about domestic terrorism.   
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the spiritual leader of interna-
tional Islamists and head of the Afghan Service Bureau Front, Abdullah Azzam,
conceptualized al-Qaeda in 1987 and wrote its founding document in 1988.
Osama bin Laden was Azzam’s deputy.2 For purposes of understanding US coun-
terterrorism policy, it is essential to remember that Washington was not aware of
the existence of al-Qaeda until about five years later. In 1992, there was an attack
on a hotel in Yemen which al-Qaeda thought was being used by US soldiers en
route to Somalia. There were no US personnel in the hotel. At the time,
Washington had no idea the perpetrator was al-Qaeda and only determined this
later.3
According to Richard Clarke, National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism under Presidents Clinton and
Bush, bin Laden and al-Qaeda never came up in the initial investigation of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing. The US subsequently established an al-
Qaeda connection. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did learn in 1993 that
bin Laden was channeling funds to Egyptian extremists. A 1995 National
Intelligence Estimate on terrorism did not mention bin Laden as a key player in
terrorism. He was known only as a financier of Islamist terrorist groups and not
someone directly involved in the organization and planning of operations. The
US continued to characterize bin Laden this way until 1997.4
The linking of al-Qaeda to the planning and organizing of terrorist attacks
during these early years in East Africa and the Horn occurred after the fact. The
point at which the US learned about al-Qaeda activities in East Africa and the
Horn is significant in terms of the US policy response. At the time of the 1993
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attacks against American troops in Somalia, the US was unaware of any al-
Qaeda involvement.5 Even today, there is a debate about the importance of al-
Qaeda’s role in Somalia in the early 1990s. 
Documentation recently published by the Harmony Project Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point clearly establishes al-Qaeda involvement in
Somalia, but it also leaves open the possibility that al-Qaeda exaggerated its
claims.6 The real threat to American and United Nations forces were Somali clan
militias, especially the one led by Mohammed Farah Aideed. We also know now
that al-Qaeda began planning in 1994 for the 1998 bombings of the US
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The US did not,
however, connect al-Qaeda to the bombings until after the attacks.
Within sub-Saharan Africa, al-Qaeda has without doubt focused its atten-
tion on East Africa and the Horn. This is the region where nearly all of its attacks,
albeit relatively few in number, have occurred. One of the leaders of the al-
Qaeda-affiliated Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), Abul Bara’ Hassan
Salman, explained in 1998 why al-Qaeda was attracted to this part of Africa:
Politically, the African Horn refers to all the countries of East Africa.
It includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya. The area
is of particular strategic importance as it links the East with the West
through the Red Sea, that is between the agrarian and industrial soci-
eties. The region is also an oil producer and has great mineral
deposits in the Red Sea. The Horn’s strategic security significance
increased since the establishment of a Jewish nation in Palestine.
These catalysts, along with some others, made the region a highly
sought-after place particularly by the colonialists and imperialists,
both past and at present.7
The countries of East Africa and the Horn offer an enticing environment
for al-Qaeda to exploit. Poverty is widespread. Social and economic inequality
is common. Political marginalization of minority groups exists in every country.
Corruption is a serious problem throughout the region. Land and sea borders are
especially porous. Populations in each country are either predominantly Muslim
or have an important Muslim minority. All of the countries are relatively close to
the origin of al-Qaeda strength in the Middle East and South Asia. In fact, one
might ask why al-Qaeda has not had more success in the region than it has exhib-
ited so far.  
Bruce Riedel, a counterterrorism expert and now a senior fellow at the
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, although not
referring explicitly to East Africa and the Horn, explained al-Qaeda’s current
strategy:
Bin Laden’s goals remain the same, as does his basic strategy. He
seeks to, as he puts it, ‘provoke and bait’ the United States into
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‘bleeding wars’ throughout the Islamic world; he wants to bankrupt
the country much as he helped bankrupt, he claims, the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The demoralized ‘far enemy’ would
then go home, allowing al Qaeda to focus on destroying its ‘near
enemies,’ Israel and the ‘corrupt’ regimes of Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan,
and Saudi Arabia.8
Sudan: Once Headquarters for al-Qaeda, Now Cooperating with the US
With a long history of hosting organizations that engage in terrorism, it is
not surprising that Osama bin Laden accepted Sudan’s offer to move there. The
government that came into power in Khartoum in 1989 drew considerable sup-
port from the National Islamic Front (NIF) led by Hassan al-Turabi. The NIF
immediately sent a delegation to meet with bin Laden and invited al-Qaeda to
establish a presence in Sudan. Bin Laden sent a team to Khartoum to meet with
the NIF and determine if a move to Sudan was in the interest of al-Qaeda.
Between late 1989 and late 1991 al-Qaeda moved most of its best trained and
experienced fighters, numbering 1,000 to 1,500, to Sudan. However, bin Laden
retained an extensive training and operational infrastructure in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. He joined his followers in Sudan late in 1991.9
Bin Laden established in Sudan some 30 businesses ranging from agricul-
ture to construction. The primary holding company was Wadi al-Aqiq, to which
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir provided a letter that offered protection of al-
Qaeda while operating in the country. al-Qaeda purchased two large farms and
built as commercial projects roads and bridges with its construction company. al-
Qaeda used one of the farms for refresher training in weapons and explosives.
One of the groups that used the facility was the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bin
Laden cultivated senior officials in the government and military and reportedly
invested $50 million in a bank closely linked to Sudanese leaders. The Sudanese
intelligence service was the intermediary between al-Qaeda and the government.
al-Qaeda eventually infiltrated the intelligence organs of the Islamic party struc-
ture. Bin Laden lived simply with only a few bodyguards. The noncombatant
component of al-Qaeda in Sudan eventually reached about 1,000 while trained
recruits grew to some 2,000.10  
Bin Laden created a confederation of terrorist organizations from through-
out the Muslim world. His vision was similar to that of al-Turabi, who convened
a series of meetings known as the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference.11 An
assassination attempt against bin Laden took place in 1994, which he attributed
to Saudi Arabia. He then stepped up his campaign against the Saudis but gener-
ally followed a practice of not taking credit for terrorist attacks.12 Al-Qaeda
trained several hundred Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) fighters in its
Sudanese and Afghan camps, and established links with African Islamist politi-
cal parties and armed groups, especially during 1992-96.13
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By early 1996, Sudan had become increasingly concerned about the poor
state of its relations with the US and inquired what it might do to improve the sit-
uation. US intelligence officials subsequently provided Sudanese Major-General
el-Fatih Erwa with a two page “non-paper” at a hotel in Rosslyn, Virginia, on 8
March 1996. It contained a list of actions that Sudan should take. Among the
items, the US asked Sudan to provide names, dates of arrival, departure and des-
tination, and passport data on mujahedin that bin Laden brought to Sudan.14
Saudi Arabia also put pressure on Sudan to take action against bin Laden. In its
response, Sudan went further than the request in the “non-paper” and in mid-May
1996 expelled bin Laden, who left with some of his family and several body-
guards in a chartered aircraft for Afghanistan. Dozens of other al-Qaeda mem-
bers followed on later flights. Sudan increasingly saw bin Laden as a liability but
insisted publicly that he departed on his own volition and that Sudan’s leaders
did not force him out. In 1998, bin Laden acknowledged, however, that he left
Sudan because Khartoum could no longer bear the pressure from the US gov-
ernment.15
An al-Qaeda operative in Sudan, Jamal al-Fadl, sought US protection after
bin Laden departed Sudan and provided critical information on al-Qaeda activi-
ties while he was living there. Based on information provided by al-Fadl, the US
concluded that bin Laden was both the financier and mastermind of al-Qaeda.
Information concerning how much of the al-Qaeda structure remained in Sudan
after bin Laden’s departure is conflicting. There were unconfirmed reports that
bin Laden occasionally visited Sudan, with one placing him in Khartoum as late
as 1998. Bin Laden closed some of his companies immediately and reportedly
took huge financial losses. According to The 9/11 Commission Report, the
Sudanese government expropriated all his assets, adding that he left Sudan with
practically nothing.16
US counterterrorist expert, Michael Scheuer, claimed that bin Laden left
Sudan on good terms with NIF leader al-Turabi, that several of his companies
continued to operate profitably, and bin Laden remained a partner in the NIF’s
al-Shimal Bank.17 Another expert on the subject, Rohan Gunaratna, argued that
bin Laden maintained ties with the government of Sudan until there was a sharp
deterioration of relations between al-Turabi and President al-Bashir, which
Gunaratna said occurred early in 2001.18 In fact, the relationship between the two
worsened in the late 1990s. In response to the August 1998 al-Qaeda attack on
the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Washington launched a cruise missile
strike against Khartoum’s al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant, which it thought was
owned by bin Laden. The US insisted that al-Shifa was implicated in the pro-
duction of chemical agents based on a soil sample collected outside the factory
gate. Persons who authorized the attack continue to assert the accuracy of the
evidence while independent investigators have found it to be highly question-
able. In addition, bin Laden no longer owned the facility.19
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Following the expulsion of al-Qaeda from Sudan and the subsequent evo-
lution of poor relations between al-Turabi and al-Bashir, the Sudanese president
found little reason to harbor terrorists. He eventually jailed al-Turabi and sig-
naled the US that he was ready to cooperate on counterterrorism. Sudan-US
counterterrorism cooperation began near the end of the Clinton administration
and picked up significantly after 9/11, perhaps because Sudan wanted to avoid
the kind of US military response that Afghanistan experienced. In any event, it is
generally acknowledged that Sudan has provided helpful information in recent
years about al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.20 The State Department’s
Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 stated that “the Sudanese government was a
strong partner in the War on Terror and aggressively pursued terrorist operations
directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan.”21
Considering the otherwise hostile relationship between the US and Sudan, pri-
marily over differences in ending the crisis in Darfur, this was an unequivocal
statement by Washington. 
Al-Qaeda was no threat to Sudan as long as bin Laden had his headquar-
ters there and he received Sudanese government cooperation. Following al-
Qaeda’s expulsion and Sudan’s significant counterterrorism cooperation with the
US, the relationship between Sudan and al-Qaeda became ambiguous.
According to one account, Sudan serves as a source of young men attracted to
al-Qaeda’s jihadist ideology. On the other hand, al-Qaeda has had little success
taking advantage of the crisis in Darfur.22 In 2006, bin Laden released an audio-
tape that called on mujahedin and their supporters to prepare for a long war
against the “Crusader plunderers” in western Sudan. He said the goal is not to
defend the Khartoum government but to defend Islam. Al-Qaeda deputy, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, subsequently described Sudan’s policy on Darfur as “deceitful and
hypocritical.”23 Jihadi forums urged their followers to go to Darfur where they
reportedly would be supported by the Salafi infrastructure in Sudan. The com-
munication listed the names of four Sudanese organizations about which nothing
is known. It appears that the jihadists have ignored this call. Both the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rejected bin
Laden’s appeal and Sudan’s government announced it would not host terrorists.24
Jihadi forums carried a short statement on 4 July 2006 announcing the
establishment of an al-Qaeda organization in Sudan. A strange incident occurred
on 13 September 2006 when a group called al-Qaeda in Sudan and Africa
claimed responsibility for kidnapping and beheading eight days earlier the chief
editor of al-Wafaq, a Sudanese independent daily. The organization said it mur-
dered journalist Mohammad Taha because he had defamed the Prophet. It is not
clear if this group is affiliated with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda or is an Islamist organ-
ization that is using al-Qaeda’s methods.25 The US government has acknowl-
edged bin Laden’s effort to expand operations in Sudan generally and Darfur in
particular but concluded that there are no indications that al-Qaeda affiliated
extremists are currently active there.26
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Ethiopia: Subject to Occasional al-Qaeda Affiliated Attacks
Ethiopia has been remarkably resistant to political Islam and experienced
relatively few terrorist attacks linked to al-Qaeda affiliated organizations.27 Most
of the al-Qaeda-related attacks in Ethiopia were carried out by a Somali-based
organization known as al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) or Islamic Unity in the early
and mid-1990s. Although probably not controlled by al-Qaeda, growing evi-
dence indicates that AIAI received training and support from al-Qaeda. Abu
Hafs al-Masri, also known as Mohammed Atef, sent a team of al-Qaeda opera-
tives to Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited Ogaden region in January 1993 where they
worked with AIAI. Abu Hafs later joined the group, appointed Sayf al-Islam as
al-Qaeda’s representative to AIAI, and detailed in an internal al-Qaeda docu-
ment some of the financial assistance provided to AIAI in 1993. Abu Hafs, born
in Egypt, was one of al-Qaeda’s most talented, trusted, and militant members.
He has a long history of operations in East Africa and the Horn. He died at an al-
Qaeda safe house in Kabul in November 2001 when coalition aircraft bombed it.
Ten months before this death, bin Laden personally nominated Abu Hafs as his
replacement and after his death created the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades in his
honor.28
AIAI conducted a number of attacks in Ethiopia and severely injured the
minister of transportation in a 1996 assassination attempt in Addis Ababa. The
most virulent AIAI branch operated from Ogaden. In 1996, Ethiopian cross-bor-
der raids against AIAI strongholds at Luuq and Buulo Haawa in Somalia severe-
ly weakened the organization. Attacks attributed with certainty to AIAI virtually
ended by the late 1990s. This resulted in a debate among experts who followed
AIAI as to its continuing existence. The International Crisis Group argued that
by 2005 AIAI had essentially ceased to exist. On the other hand, several key per-
sonnel in the defunct AIAI assumed control of senior positions in the Union of
Islamic Courts in Somalia, which controlled much of the country by late 2006.
This development contributed significantly to Ethiopia’s decision in December
2006 to destroy the Islamic Court structure inside Somalia.29
Following Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia, al-Qaeda, or at least organ-
izations claiming to speak for al-Qaeda, threatened to step up attacks against
Ethiopia. A previously unknown Islamic group in Ethiopia calling itself the
Mujahedin of the Land of Two Migrations announced its formation on an Arabic
language website at the end of 2006. It pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden,
appealed for the establishment of sharia in Ethiopia, and warned of imminent
attacks on US interests in Africa. There is no evidence so far that it has a func-
tional link with al-Qaeda. Since then, a variety of groups have taken to the inter-
net threatening Ethiopia and other supporters of the Somali Transitional Federal
Government. They include the Youth Mujahedin Movement and the Brigades of
Tawhid Wal Jihad in the Land of Somalia. An al-Qaeda militant, Abu Yahya al-
Libi, who escaped from a US prison in Afghanistan, appeared on al-Qaeda’s offi-
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cial media web site in March 2007 and called for an Iraq-style guerrilla war
against Ethiopia. Although one or more of these groups may be responsible for
terrorist attacks in Mogadishu against Ethiopian forces, there it no indication
they have the capacity to strike inside Ethiopia.30
In June 1995, an unsuccessful assassination attempt took place against
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was en route from the Addis Ababa
airport to an Organization of African Unity meeting in the central city. The inves-
tigation placed the blame on Egypt’s Gama’at al-Islamiya (The Islamic Group),
which had help from Sudanese officials. al-Qaeda has been closely linked to this
Egyptian terrorist group. In a 2006 interview, Sudan’s Hassan al-Turabi acknowl-
edged the involvement of unnamed Sudanese officials in the failed assassination
attempt that was carried out by Egyptian nationals, but insisted President al-
Bashir did not know of the plot and that bin Laden had nothing to do with it. On
the other hand, radios purchased by al-Qaeda in Japan were used in the plot and
the US believes the person responsible for the purchase of the radios was in
charge of finance for al-Qaeda and close to bin Laden.31
Eritrea: Living Dangerously but Generally Free of al-Qaeda Activity
With a long Red Sea border, predominantly Christian leadership, and a
population that is about 50 percent Muslim, Eritrea would seem to be a good can-
didate for al-Qaeda interest. But except for attacks instigated primarily in the
1990s by the then Sudan-based EIJM, Eritrea has been surprisingly free of al-
Qaeda related activity. Interestingly, Abdullah Azzam, one of the persons who
inspired al-Qaeda’s philosophy, in 1988 considered Eritrea to be among other
countries as a possible base for developing jihadis.32 Eritrea may have recently
bought itself some good will with Islamist forces by actively supporting the
Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia.      
The EIJM originated at a conference in Khartoum in 1988 when the
Eritrean Muslim Pioneers Organization and the Eritrean National Islamic
Liberation Front merged with several smaller organizations. Although the first
EIJM militants entered Eritrea in 1989, offensive military operations did not
occur until later. EIJM experienced some internal splits as the more extreme
wing came to dominate the organization, and it increased its ties with al-Qaeda
in Sudan. By the mid-1990s, it had an estimated 500 fighters. Bin Laden provid-
ed weapons and training. EIJM even held a seat on al-Qaeda’s international net-
work’s coordinating council, the Majlis al Fatwa. By 1993, EIJM was carrying
out occasional raids and ambushes inside Eritrea. Following its second general
conference in Khartoum in 1994, EIJM expanded its attacks. This underscored
its link to bin Laden’s terror network and in early 1995 led to a rupture in rela-
tions between Eritrea and Sudan. Asmara then called for the overthrow of the
government in Khartoum.33 
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Following the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998,
Eritrea, like Ethiopia, decided it must improve relations with Sudan. Although it
took much longer for Eritrea to achieve this goal than it did Ethiopia, Sudan-
Eritrea relations are now much better and Sudan seems to have reigned in the
EIJM. The most recent EIJM activity dates back to 2003, when Eritrea charged
that EIJM was responsible for the killing of a British geologist in Red Sea State.
EIJM denied the allegation, saying it only targeted the government. A few
months later, the “military secretariat” of the Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement
took credit for several attacks on Eritrean military targets and claimed that it had
replaced EIJM. The picture became even more confused near the end of 2003
when Eritrea claimed EIJM attacked a vehicle and killed two Eritrean employ-
ees from the US non-governmental organization, Mercy Corps. The US linked
the attack to al-Qaeda.  There have been no further reports of EIJM attacks in
Eritrea, but the Harmony Project noted that Eritrean jihad movements have
active web sites, such as www.islaher.org.34
Djibouti: Managing to Remain Out of Harm’s Way    
Djibouti, an overwhelmingly Muslim country, seems to have avoided any
significant al-Qaeda activity. It has long hosted French military forces, and since
2002, Djibouti has served as the headquarters for the American Combined Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa, which has about 1,700 military and civilian person-
nel dedicated to combating extremism and terrorism in the region. Djibouti has
been a strong supporter of US counterterrorism efforts. This combination could
lead, however, to increased al-Qaeda interest in Djibouti in the future.
Al-Qaeda operative Abu Hafs al-Masri complained in an internal al-
Qaeda memo, probably dating from the early 1990s, that its operative in Djibouti
had to be removed immediately “because he is susceptible to Djibouti’s corrup-
tion as a single male, and replaced with Abu Ahmed al-Radji, who is married.”35
The Iraqi intelligence service in Djibouti reported in 2001 that al-Qaeda deliv-
ered messages in Arabic and French, allegedly signed by bin Laden, threatening
to blow up certain foreign companies in Djibouti unless they ceased cooperating
with the US. This threat resulted in stronger security by the French military and
US embassy but apparently resulted in no al-Qaeda attack.36
AIAI has had cells in Djibouti going back to the early 1990s. The
International Crisis Group quoted a senior French military source in 2005 stating
that AIAI had a quiet presence in Djibouti. A Djibouti government official told
the Crisis Group that it tries to engage AIAI personnel to ensure they remain
quiet.37 Most observers who follow AIAI activity now agree that it is defunct;
these recent comments from Djibouti may reflect the views of former AIAI
members who still trade on the name.  
Shinn  1/1/70  6:54 AM  Page 55
Summer 2007
56
Somalia: In the Eye of the al-Qaeda Storm
The evidence is now clear that al-Qaeda played a role in the attacks on
American and UN forces in Somalia during the intervention that began in
December 1992 and continued, in the case of the UN, until the spring of 1995.
Although the international relief effort opened up corridors for the delivery of
food for starving Somalis and ended the famine, it became preoccupied by the
spring of 1993 with the capture of Mogadishu warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed.
This distracted the international effort from nation building and led to constant
conflict between UN forces and certain Somali clan groups. A decision to end
American participation in the UN operation occurred following the 3-4 October
1993 battle between Aideed’s militia and US special forces popularized by Mark
Bowden’s book, Black Hawk Down.  
Even with the benefit of recently released declassified information and
new analyses, there continues to be serious differences concerning the impor-
tance of the role al-Qaeda played in supporting Somali militias against the ini-
tial American-led intervention and then the UN operation. The Harmony Project
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, which relied heavily on declassified
al-Qaeda documents that fell into the hands of American intelligence, conclud-
ed that Africa regional al-Qaeda leader, Abu Hafs, made multiple trips to
Somalia from the al-Qaeda base in Khartoum beginning in 1992. He met with
militants, assessed capabilities, and made arrangements to provide training and
arms for fighters. In late January 1993, Abu Hafs designated a team of al-Qaeda
veterans to conduct operations in Somalia. al-Qaeda believed that Somalia
would offer a safe haven for its operations and allow it to target the US in both
Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula. The first al-Qaeda operatives left Peshawar,
Pakistan, transited Kenya, and arrived in Somalia in early February 1993. The
group operated like a traditional special forces group, working closely with AIAI
and establishing three training camps. It apparently took orders from the al-
Qaeda headquarters in Khartoum.38
Rohan Gunaratna placed the beginning of the al-Qaeda effort in Somalia
in early 1992 as a result of visits to Somalia by Abu Hafs starting in that year. Al-
Qaeda’s chief instructor, Ali Muhammad, began training AIAI personnel in early
1993. Gunaratna argued that al-Qaeda-trained AIAI members were responsible
for shooting down the two US helicopters on 3-4 October when 18 Americans
died during the fighting. This is contrary to conventional wisdom at the time of
the attack which believed Aideed’s militia was responsible. Gunaratna asserted
that al-Qaeda also trained Somalis who killed Belgian and Pakistani peacekeep-
ers, adding that some 400 al-Qaeda fighters went to Somalia in 1993.39 The 9/11
Commission Report tends to support this account but acknowledged it may
reflect al-Qaeda boasting.40 Michael Scheuer, although withholding final judg-
ment on al-Qaeda’s role in aiding the Somalis, seemed inclined to concur with
the argument for robust al-Qaeda involvement.41 A 1997 report by the East
Shinn  1/1/70  6:54 AM  Page 56
The Journal of Conflict Studies
57
Africa al-Qaeda cell stated that al-Qaeda, working through AIAI, took part in
the 3-4 October battle but did not otherwise specify its assistance.42
In a very recent analysis, Lawrence Wright offered a subdued account of
al-Qaeda’s role in the 1993 fighting. He noted that bin Laden claimed that he
sent 250 fighters to Somalia to attack US troops. Wright then pointed out that
Sudanese intelligence reports said the number was only a handful. Al-Qaeda did
provide some training but found that Somalis were not appreciative and relations
with al-Qaeda personnel were strained. Wright acknowledged that bin Laden
attributed to al-Qaeda the downing of the two US helicopters and the desecra-
tion of US servicemen. Wright concluded, however, that bin Laden simply took
credit for victories in which al-Qaeda had little involvement. He also observed
that the US dropped charges of al-Qaeda responsibility for the killing of
Americans in Somalia in a case against bin Laden in a New York court. No tes-
timony in any court cases against al-Qaeda operatives proved that bin Laden or
al-Qaeda was responsible for the deaths of Americans in Somalia.43
Memoirs written by senior insiders do not resolve the debate. George
Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence, commented that bin Laden sent
some of his people to Somalia to advise Aideed, who at the time was attacking
American troops. Tenet did not draw any conclusions as to the importance of al-
Qaeda’s help. Richard Clarke seemed more convinced that al-Qaeda played an
important role but based this view on allegations in the indictment of bin Laden
that were subsequently dropped in court. Both Tenet and Clarke agreed, howev-
er, that bin Laden interpreted the departure of the US from Somalia as a sign of
weakness, encouraging him to press harder against the US in other parts of the
world.44 Bin Laden stated in a 1994 interview that al-Qaeda was surprised by the
“collapse of American morale” in Somalia, adding it “convinced us that the
Americans are a paper tiger.”45
The Harmony Project has done an excellent analysis of early al-Qaeda
involvement in Somalia and the problems the organization faced. Al-Qaeda
clearly wanted to establish a franchise in Somalia and leaders like Abu Hafs
expected Somalia would be a low-cost recruiting ground where disaffected peo-
ple in a failed state would readily join its ranks. Al-Qaeda believed the Somalis
would enthusiastically join the fight to expel the international peacekeeping
force. Somalia seemed to be another Afghanistan in the view of al-Qaeda. The
Harmony Project concluded that the reality of the situation was quite different.
Al-Qaeda underestimated the cost of operating in Somalia. Getting in and out of
the country was costly. Expenses resulting from corruption in neighboring states
were high, while poor security in Somalia increased its costs. Al-Qaeda con-
stantly experienced extortion from Somali clans and unanticipated losses when
bandits attacked their convoys. Al-Qaeda overestimated the degree to which
Somalis would become jihadis, especially if there was no financial incentive.
Many Somali clan leaders wanted the US and UN forces to leave Somalia, but
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their first goal was the security of their clan against others. Abu Hafs spent con-
siderable time and scarce resources building consensus among Somali leaders to
keep them focused on expelling foreign occupiers instead of fighting with other
Somalis.46
According to the Harmony Project, al-Qaeda failed to understand the
importance of traditional Sufi doctrine in Somali Islam. Al-Qaeda tried to con-
vince Somalis to accept Salafi beliefs without offering financial incentives. In
some cases al-Qaeda operatives appeared stunned at the depth of resistance they
encountered from Sufi clerics. Nor did al-Qaeda appreciate the Somali attach-
ment to clans and sub-clans. The Harmony Project said al-Qaeda’s efforts fell
short for many of the same reasons that Western interventions failed in the past:
it simply did not understand the political, economic, and social dynamics of
Somalia. Unlike the tribal areas of Pakistan, it found a lawless land of shifting
alliances that lacked Sunni unity. Al-Qaeda largely failed to overcome local loy-
alties, although it did buy its way into a few sub-sub clans. The Somali practice
of inclusive, consensus decision-making collided with al-Qaeda’s need for rapid
decisions. Al-Qaeda also complained about the lack of secrecy in Somalia. The
primacy of clan ultimately frustrated al-Qaeda’s efforts to recruit and develop a
unified coalition.47
Al-Qaeda did have some early success. It managed to recruit a number of
young Somalis who found the call to jihad more compatible with their desire for
adventure. It also found acceptance in those few areas where it was able to estab-
lish security and order. It accomplished this at Ras Kamboni, a small Indian
Ocean port town near the Kenya border. Even today, Ras Kamboni is considered
a hotbed of radical Islam and was a stronghold of the Islamic Courts movement.
There have been numerous reports for years that Ras Kamboni served as a ter-
rorist training camp where jihadis from outside the country were frequent visi-
tors. Nevertheless, based on declassified documents covering the first 18 months
of al-Qaeda’s experience in Somalia, Harmony Project found that the jihadi for-
eigners encountered more adversity than success.48
Coincident with the failure of a national government and al-Qaeda’s
involvement in Somalia, there has been an Islamist revival. Most of these
Islamist organizations are relatively moderate and have no apparent association
with terrorism. Examples include al-Islah (Revival) and the Tabligh movement.
A few Islamic groups such as AIAI followed a jihadi philosophy.49 In spite of
numerous attempts since 1991, Somalis failed to fashion a widely accepted
national government. Except for the provision of emergency assistance, the inter-
national community largely abandoned Somalia after the US left in March 1994
and UN intervention ended in 1995. Islamic groups, often supported by Somali
business persons who continued to thrive, began to perform some of the func-
tions normally conducted by government. The Islamic Courts became particular-
ly important as they began to establish islands of security in Mogadishu. 
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The events of 9/11 and especially the US invasion of Afghanistan briefly
revived Washington’s interest in Somalia when some in the government thought
that the defeat of the Taliban would result in a move to Somalia by the remnants
of the al-Qaeda organization. For the reasons identified by the Harmony Project,
this did not happen but it did lead to greater US concern about Somali links to
terrorism. The US has long believed that extremist elements in AIAI have pro-
tected three key al-Qaeda operatives — Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (aka Harun
Fazul) of the Comoro Islands, Abu Talha al-Sudani of Sudan, and Saleh Ali Saleh
Nabhan of Kenya — who took part in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. The US also developed evidence that AIAI received
some of its funding from the Saudi Islamic charity, al-Haramain, which had an
office in Mogadishu. The US pressured Saudi Arabia to shut down al-Haramain,
which had ties with al-Qaeda. In a separate move, the US froze the assets of a
Somali money transfer company, al-Barakat, alleging that it supported al-Qaeda
financially. Al-Barakat denied any al-Qaeda connection but has been unable to
resume its operations.50
The first Islamic Courts appeared in Somalia in the early 1990s. They were
based primarily on local efforts to establish a degree of security in an anarchic
situation. As a result, most Somalis accepted their presence.  Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys, a former vice chairman and military commander of AIAI, started
a new type of court in 1998 in the port city of Merka that became a vehicle for
the expansion of Ayr sub-sub-clan political and economic interests. This particu-
lar court also emerged as a platform for jihadi Islamism. By late 2005, there were
11 clan-based courts in Mogadishu, some closely linked with Aweys’s brand of
radicalism while others functioned more traditionally. Because of his AIAI lead-
ership role, Aweys had links to the terrorist attacks against Ethiopia in the mid-
1990s. He also had close ties with several young Somalis, some of whom had
trained in Afghanistan and followed a jihadist agenda. They included Ibrahim al-
Afghani, Mukhtar Ibrahim Robow, and Hashi Ayro. The latter has been linked to
the desecration of a colonial-era Italian cemetery in Mogadishu, the murder of
four foreign aid workers, a British journalist, and a well-known Somali peace
activist. It is generally believed that Ayro’s militia, which became known as the
Shabaab (The Youth), provided protection for the three al-Qaeda operatives
sought by the US.51
The US became increasingly concerned with the growing power of the
Islamic Courts and in February 2006 aided the creation of the Alliance for
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), a coalition of Mogadishu
warlords opposed to the courts. The US had earlier arranged the rendition of two
suspected al-Qaeda operatives from Somalia, but the new threat seemed in its
view to call for a more serious response. The US goal in funding the ARPCT
appears to have had the narrow purpose of snatching several al-Qaeda operatives
who had taken refuge in Somalia. The new organization of warlords used the
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ARPCT, however, to wage war on the courts. The warlords had lost the support
of most Somalis who just wanted an end to conflict. The ARPCT military effort
fared badly and by June 2006 the Islamic Courts had defeated the ARPCT deci-
sively.52
By mid-December 2006, the Islamic Courts controlled about 50 percent of
the former Somali Republic. They did not control Somaliland, Puntland, and the
area around Baidoa in south central Somalia.  Abdullahi Yusuf’s internationally
recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was generally confined to
Baidoa, where Ethiopian troops protected it from the militia of the Islamic
Courts. As the courts expanded their influence, the TFG, Ethiopia, and the US
became increasingly concerned. The courts had already declared a jihad against
Ethiopia for sending troops into Somalia to support the TFG. One of the court’s
two most senior leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, began to revive Somalia’s
long-standing, but dormant, irredentist claims against Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabit-
ed Ogaden. The other senior leader in the Islamic Courts, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed, did not make the irredentist argument and seemed to keep his distance
from terrorists and any connection with al-Qaeda.  
As the Islamic Courts consolidated power in 2006, al-Qaeda confined
itself to passive and verbal support of the Islamists and warnings to the West not
to interfere. A message under the name of Osama bin Laden appeared on the web
in July urging Somalis to build an Islamic state and back the courts in their fight
against the TFG. Bin Laden opposed the arrival of military forces in Somalia
from any country, i.e. any country that supported the TFG, and said his al-Qaeda
network would fight them if they intervened in Somalia. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-
Qaeda’s number two, gave an interview in September in which he called on
Somalis to oppose the TFG and expel the “Zionist-Crusader presence” from the
Horn of Africa.53
The TFG had long claimed that the Islamic Courts had close ties to al-
Qaeda, and  increasingly, Ethiopia and the US picked up this theme. Ethiopian
Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, stated in early November 2006 that al-Qaeda-
linked militants controlled much of Somalia. In addition, the courts reportedly
provided military support to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and
the little known United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), both of
which maintained offices in Mogadishu. Ethiopia’s nemesis, Eritrea, was sup-
plying arms to and training Islamic Court militia and the ONLF. There were also
reliable reports that small numbers of personnel from the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF), which has its headquarters in Asmara, showed up in Somalia. The
OLF neither confirmed nor denied the presence of its fighters in Somalia.54 There
is no indication that the ONLF and OLF have any connection with al-Qaeda, but
their goal is to defeat the government in Addis Ababa. 
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 stated that the
Council of Islamic Courts had become hijacked by the Shabaab, which it
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described as a “small extremist group affiliated with al-Qaeda that consists of
radicalized young men, between 20 and 30 years of age. Many of its senior lead-
ers are believed to have trained and fought with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.”55 US
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, told reporters in
mid-December, “The Council of Islamic Courts is now controlled by al-Qaeda
cell individuals, East Africa al-Qaeda cell individuals. The top layer of the court
are extremists. They are terrorists.”56
The International Crisis Group concluded that Frazer’s characterization of
the courts as controlled by al-Qaeda was an exaggeration but acknowledged that
a number of their leaders have been linked to al-Qaeda. At least one senior al-
Qaeda figure — Abu Talha al-Sudani — was believed to exert considerable
influence over the court leadership. A steady influx of jihadi volunteers from
across the Muslim world strengthened the al-Qaeda presence in Somalia in late
2006. Although estimates of their numbers varied widely, most observers believe
several hundred arrived in Somalia. Most were not battle-hardened veterans but
inexperienced soldiers of fortune who required considerable supervision by the
courts. Although the courts repeatedly rejected any links to terrorism, they did
not formally invite any international party to visit Mogadishu for the purpose of
verifying or rejecting the presence of international terrorists. In private talks with
European and US diplomats they stonewalled, reinforcing the impression they
were shielding extremists.57
The Islamic Courts made a critical error in mid-December. They sent their
poorly trained and largely conscripted militia to the vicinity of Baidoa and
attacked the TFG militia and the professional Ethiopian army that was protecting
the TFG. The Ethiopians easily crushed the Islamic Court militia and quickly
marched to Mogadishu. To the surprise of virtually everyone, the Islamic Court
militia, rather than try to lure the Ethiopians into urban guerrilla combat, aban-
doned Mogadishu. In retrospect, it appears their support in Mogadishu was broad
but not deep. Somalis appreciated the fact that they had created a secure city,
begun a cleanup campaign, and restored operations at the port and airport. On the
other hand, they disagreed with some of the edicts and practices of the more rad-
ical courts, which operated on a highly decentralized basis. Most of the Islamic
Court leadership and militia headed south for the port city of Kismayo, which it
briefly occupied. Chased out of Kismayo, militia members dispersed along and
across the Kenya border. Ethiopian forces pursued them to the border where
small numbers of US special forces joined from Kenya. 
Throughout the first half of 2007 the TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops,
worked hard to establish control in Mogadishu. Most of the rest of Somalia
remained generally calm. The TFG encountered serious problems with some of
the sub-sub-clans, especially the Ayr, who thought they were being excluded
from power. Common criminals and remnants of the courts’ militant wing, the
Shabaab, also opposed the TFG and Ethiopian presence in Mogadishu. The
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African Union peacekeeping force of a projected 8,000 troops only managed to
attract about 1,600 Ugandans who generally tried to avoid conflict with those
forces in Mogadishu that opposed the TFG. It would appear, however, that the
only part of the opposition having al-Qaeda connections was the jihadi leader-
ship of the Shabaab and some non-Somali jihadists who joined with them. This
group is most probably responsible for the occasional suicide bombing, political
assassination, and placement of command detonated mine. These tactics are
largely new to Somalia and not common among Somalis.58
Once Islamic Court extremists, especially members of the Shabaab,
departed Kismayo for the Kenya border, the US launched two AC-130 gunship
attacks against them. The first strike on 7 January 2007 near Ras Kamboni killed
eight militants but not any of the three persons involved in the 1998 bombings of
the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The target of the attack report-
edly was Shabaab leader Hashi Ayro. Ethiopian troops and a member of the
American special operations unit, Task Force 88, subsequently found a bloodied
passport and other items that led them to believe Ayro may have been injured.59
A second AC-130 strike took place on 23 January that targeted Sheikh Ahmed
Madobe, a senior Islamic Court leader. Madobe survived the attack but report-
edly was later captured by the Ethiopians. The AC-130s operated out of a small
airfield in eastern Ethiopia, a fact subsequently denied by Ethiopia.60
Members of US Task Force 88 were on the ground in southern Somalia
searching for key al-Qaeda operatives, especially Fazul Abdullah Mohammed,
who was believed to be the leader of al-Qaeda’s East African cell. Fazul had
been receiving protection provided by certain members of the Islamic Courts.
Kenyan police did apprehend Fazul’s wife, Halima Badroudine, and their three
children on 11 January as they attempted to flee Somalia into Kenya. When
arrested, she had a laptop computer, 1,600 Euros, and $5,000 in cash. She appar-
ently had joined Fazul in Mogadishu from Pakistan only 10 days before they had
to flee the capital for southern Somalia. Fazul, a master of disguise and man with
many identities, reportedly fooled even some members of the Islamic Courts.61
Subsequently, Kenyan authorities deported Halima Badroudine and her
children to Somalia where Ethiopian troops took custody before sending them to
Ethiopia. The Kenyans also deported to Somalia dozens of other suspect fighters
and supporters of the Islamic Court militias. Those deported included nationals
of Yemen, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sweden, Comoro
Islands, and Morocco.62 Ethiopia released Halima Badroudine and her three chil-
dren in late May. Kenyan authorities said that brought to 22 the number of per-
sons released who had been captured fleeing Somalia.63 One of the persons cap-
tured in southern Somalia and eventually released was a US citizen from New
Jersey, Amir Mohamed Meshal. He told investigators that he had been at an al-
Qaeda camp west of Mogadishu but denied being a fighter or undergoing mili-
tary training.64
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In early June 2007, a US warship attacked a small group of al-Qaeda sus-
pects hiding in a mountainous region near the coast in the semi-autonomous
region of Puntland in northeastern Somalia. The US apparently had special
forces on the ground and an unmanned plane in the air while coordinating the
attack with Puntland authorities. Among the six killed in the attack, one report-
edly had an American passport. The others had passports from the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Morocco, Pakistan, and Yemen. There has been no subse-
quent public confirmation that the persons killed in the attack were linked to al-
Qaeda. There were reports from the region that American aircraft continued to
hunt jihadi elements in the area for a number of days after the initial navy
strike.65
Al-Qaeda continues its propaganda campaign that calls on Somalis to wage
a jihad. Ayman al-Zawahri released an audiotape early in 2007 urging Islamists
in Somalia to launch an Iraq-style campaign of suicide attacks against the
Ethiopians until the Islamists reclaim their country.66 Abu Yahya al-Libi, a
prominent al-Qaeda leader, in a video released in March called on Muslim fight-
ers to “let the volcano erupt” in Somalia and battle against “the Abyssinian occu-
piers and their apostate lackeys.”67 A variety of other organizations have joined
the internet war against the TFG and Ethiopia, and in favor of jihad in Somalia.
It is not clear if they are connected to al-Qaeda but they are clearly trying to
recruit extremist elements to Somalia. One especially active group is the Young
Mujahedin Movement, which has claimed responsibility for suicide car bomb-
ings in Mogadishu.68 Imitating tactics in Iraq and elsewhere, Islamic insurgents
in Somalia created a video showing a man reciting prayers before apparently
blowing himself up in a suicide blast. The Associated Press obtained the video
from a person associated with the Shabaab.69
The US was convinced well into 2007 that al-Qaeda remained active in
Somalia. US ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, commented in April
that the Shebaab harbored al-Qaeda members responsible for the attacks on the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He added that Saudi Arabia
believes Somalia has become an important training ground for Saudis affiliated
with al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, the State Department announced that 10 al-Qaeda
operatives remained in Somalia who are at least partially responsible for the
growing violence in Mogadishu. It added that six of them are well-known Somali
leaders in the Islamic Courts, while four are international al-Qaeda members
with years of experience in Africa.70 Following his announcement as the US spe-
cial envoy to Somalia, John Yates claimed that a recent roadside bomb that killed
four Ugandan peacekeepers was evidence of al-Qaeda activity in Mogadishu.71
Ambassador Ranneberger added in late May that al-Qaeda has for many years
been taking advantage of Somalia’s status as a failed state, both as a safe haven
and base of operations.72
In early June, an unsuccessful suicide bomber attack took place against
TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, who stated that al-Qaeda was behind
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the effort. The Young Mujahedin Movement, which posted an announcement on
a website used by al-Qaeda and other Islamic militants, claimed responsibility
for the attack. Seven Somalis, including five of the prime minister’s bodyguards,
died in the explosion. The Young Mujahedin Movement also took credit in the
same announcement for a number of roadside bombings and attacks on Somali
policemen.73
The Pentagon announced in early June the recent capture and transfer to
Guantanamo of a suspected al-Qaeda terrorist, a Somali national identified as
Abdullahi Sudi Arale. A Defense Department spokesperson described him as “an
extremely dangerous member of the al-Qaida network,” adding that he was sus-
pected of acting as a courier between al-Qaeda in East Africa and the network in
Pakistan.74 The Pentagon also alleged that Arale had held a leadership role in
Somalia’s Islamic Court structure and stated that his capture underscored the
threat that the US faces from dangerous extremists.75 Arale may well be linked
to al-Qaeda but his name is not known to those outside the US government who
follow extremists in Somalia.  
After reviewing an extensive quantity of information on terrorism and al-
Qaeda activity in the region, the Harmony Project concluded that the threat of
terrorism from Somalia has yet to materialize as predicted. It added that the
inherent challenges of operating in a failed state combined with specific local
factors make Somalia an unfavorable place for foreign terrorists to operate in or
from.76 While I agree that there are many challenges for any foreigner with a
non-Somali agenda to function in the country, the Harmony Project may under-
state al-Qaeda’s accomplishments so far. While spectacular al-Qaeda attacks
have occurred in neighboring Kenya and not in Somalia, there are many tempt-
ing targets in Kenya and very few in Somalia. The fact that al-Qaeda operatives
have been able to move in and out of Somalia with relative ease suggests that
Somalis either don’t know who these people are or don’t much care. 
Finally, al-Qaeda has been able to recruit a small number of Somalis and
in the environment of East Africa and the Horn it only takes a few for an organ-
ization like al-Qaeda to conduct clandestine operations. The US does itself no
service, however, when it exaggerates the terrorist and al-Qaeda threat in
Somalia. Al-Qaeda, which engages in its own hyperbole, is only too happy to
have the US echo its “success.”         
Kenya: The Most Frequent Victim of Major al-Qaeda Attacks
Of all the countries in the region, Kenya has been subject to the most
severe al-Qaeda attacks. The Harmony Project suggested the principal reasons
for this situation were a target-rich environment for terrorists, a weak security
and criminal justice system, and the presence of a disaffected minority Muslim
population, especially along Kenya’s Swahili coast. These factors provide al-
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Qaeda with an operational environment that presents less security pressure than
elsewhere in the region with the possible exception of Somalia.77
Wadih el-Hage, who had served as bin Laden’s personal secretary, was
born in Lebanon and obtained US citizenship through marriage. He went to
Nairobi in 1994 to run the al-Qaeda operation and remained until September
1997, when he returned to the US under pressure from Kenyan and US authori-
ties. The FBI arrested him in October 1998 following the embassy bombings. He
was convicted on terrorism charges in 2001.78 The CIA knew there had been an
al-Qaeda cell in Kenya but thought, working with the Kenyan police, they had
broken it up. Kenyan authorities arrested five individuals in Nairobi in 1997 sus-
pected of connections to bin Laden.79 Former US ambassador to Kenya, Johnnie
Carson, wrote in 2005 that although Kenya has not produced any indigenous ter-
rorist organization, at least one and probably two al-Qaeda cells had operated
there for more than a decade. He added that more than a half dozen Kenyan
nationals and their family members have been implicated in significant al-Qaeda
attacks and three of al-Qaeda’s senior leaders in East Africa traveled routinely in
and out of Kenya.80
Al-Qaeda began planning the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1994. Abu Ubadiah al-Banshiri and, following
his death on Lake Victoria, his deputy and successor, Abu Hafs, did the planning
together with Ali Muhammad, who surveyed the US embassy in Nairobi as a
possible target. He took photographs and made reconnaissance sketches. Bin
Laden, then in Khartoum, applied his engineering knowledge to identify the best
entry for the explosive laden vehicle. Al-Qaeda also developed a diamond import
business in Kenya for raising and laundering money. Originally planned for
1996, al-Qaeda delayed the operation due to difficulties in Sudan that followed
the 1995 failed assassination of President Mubarak, the death of al-Banshiri, and
the expulsion of bin Laden from Sudan. The operation against the embassies was
planned as a suicide mission. Two Saudis entered the embassy perimeter in an
explosive-laden truck. One died in the blast; the other, Rashed Daoud al-Owali,
jumped out of the vehicle before the explosion occurred and escaped. The attack
killed 213 persons and wounded about 4,500, the vast majority Kenyan.
Authorities in Kenya arrested al-Owali and sent him to the US, where a court in
New York convicted him in 2001; he is serving a life sentence. Kenyan officials
and the FBI also implicated the local offices of four Islamic charities in al-
Qaeda’s attack, including the Saudi International Islamic Relief Organization
and al-Haramain.81
In November 2002, al-Qaeda bombed the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in
Kikambala along the beach north of Mombasa, killing 15 persons and injuring
another 35. In a coordinated attack, an al-Qaeda team fired two SA-7 missiles at
an Israeli passenger plane, Arkia flight 582, that departed from Moi International
Airport in Mombasa. One missile hit the aircraft but failed to explode while the
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other narrowly missed. Investigators found two missile launchers and two addi-
tional SA-7 missiles at the launch site. They were the same series and production
line as missiles fired by al-Qaeda at an American military plane in Saudi Arabia
earlier in the year. The mastermind behind the attacks was Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed, who also took part in the attack on the US embassy in Nairobi. An
al-Qaeda spokesman took credit for the attack in an audio tape broadcast by the
al-Jazeera television channel.82
In March 2003, the British government warned of an imminent terrorist
attack in East Africa and suggested the target was Western interests in Kenya.
The US alerted American citizens to avoid unessential travel to Kenya. The UK
suspended international flights to and from Kenya from mid-May until June
2003 in response to concerns there might be a missile attack similar to the one
that occurred in Mombasa in 2002. President Bush had planned to visit Africa in
early 2003, including a stop in Nairobi where he would praise the successful
Kenyan elections that had occurred in late 2002 and encourage the north-south
peace talks concerning Sudan. When the White House finally rescheduled the
trip to Africa, it substituted Uganda for Kenya. The primary reason for changing
the stop was a fear that al-Qaeda terrorists in East Africa might try to attack the
president’s plane with a shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile. US and British
intelligence did foil an al-Qaeda plot in June 2003 to crash an airplane and drive
a truck full of explosives into the new American embassy in Nairobi. The plan
was developed in Somalia and involved participation of Somali and Somali
Kenyans associated with al-Qaeda. Kenya sealed off its airspace to flights from
Somalia and banned the flight of small aircraft from airports within Kenya. The
US embassy closed for five days.83
The US has not been satisfied with Kenyan efforts to prosecute alleged al-
Qaeda operatives captured in the country. In June 2005, a Kenyan court acquit-
ted seven suspects arrested on charges related to the Kikambala Hotel bombing
and the attempted shooting-down of the Israeli airplane in November 2002, the
1998 attack on the American embassy in Nairobi, and the 2003 plot to attack the
new US embassy.84 On the other hand, the US appreciated Kenyan cooperation
when it deployed forces along its border with Somalia in December 2006 to pre-
vent fleeing Somali Islamic Court militia from entering Kenya.85
Al-Qaeda almost certainly continues to maintain cells in Kenya, which is
riddled with corruption and has a marginalized Islamic minority along the
Swahili coast and the border with Somalia. In fact, the Harmony Project sees al-
Qaeda terrorism in Kenya as posing a greater threat than the one from Somalia.
It pointed out that al-Qaeda operatives continue to move about the country
freely, establish businesses along the coast and in Nairobi, operate Islamic char-
ities, find local brides, rent light aircraft to come and go from Somalia, hold
meetings, communicate with al-Qaeda outside the country, transfer money,
stockpile weapons, and engage in undetected reconnoitering of possible targets.86
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Several other factors enhance Kenya’s attractiveness as an al-Qaeda target.
It has a long history of close relations with the US, United Kingdom, and Israel.
It is geographically close to longstanding conflicts in northern Uganda, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Its porous borders permit al-Qaeda to travel
between Somalia by sea and land. Kenya has small but significant Arab, Arab-
Swahili, and Somali minorities concentrated in coastal Kenya, Nairobi, several
other urban centers, and along the border with Somalia. Many residents of
coastal Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu have stronger ties with the Arabian
Peninsula than with Kenya’s interior. Kenya has a serious problem with corrup-
tion that makes it easy for terrorists to use airports, cross borders, and obtain
identity papers and travel documents. The Harmony Project concluded that in
this region Kenya is a decisive battleground between al-Qaeda and the West.87
Many Muslims along the Kenyan coast have a profound sense of grievance
against the Kenyan government. Its Arab and Arab-Swahili leaders went from
being highly privileged under the British to becoming subjects of a largely alien
hinterland and non-Muslim elite. Poverty along the coast exacerbates the differ-
ences.88 Not everyone agrees with the Harmony Project that Kenyan Muslims are
such good terrorist recruitment prospects. One scholar who has spent consider-
able time along the coast concluded that bin Laden may be admired but he has
not won the sympathy of Muslims. He symbolizes resistance against the global
political and economic hegemony of the US and has dared to stand up to the
world’s only superpower. Kenyans praise his courage but not his actions.89
Similarly, William Roseanu at RAND argued that although conditions in Kenya
are ideal for conducting terrorist operations, other factors essential to the terror-
ist recruitment process are largely absent. He concluded that Islamic radicals had
made little headway in Kenya and doubted that al-Qaeda can expect to attract
more than a handful of new members.90 But as we have seen elsewhere, it only
requires a handful of operatives and a receptive environment to conduct suc-
cessful terrorist activity.  
Tanzania: Victim of One Major al-Qaeda Attack 
The bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam in August 1998 caused
US and Tanzanian authorities to take a much harder look at the presence of al-
Qaeda in the country. An extensive study by Global Witness concluded that al-
Qaeda operatives based in Nairobi, Wadih el-Hage, and Abu Ubadiah al-
Banshiri, began in 1993 to use diamonds, tanzanite, and rubies as a resource to
make the cells financially self-sufficient. Al-Qaeda purchased property in
Tanzania to mine diamonds and gold and established trading companies to laun-
der illicit diamonds that probably came from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. For this purpose, they established Taheer Ltd. and Tanzanite King in
Tanzania.91
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Evidence at the trails in New York also suggested that al-Qaeda was
deeply involved in the semi-precious tanzanite trade in Tanzania. In response to
this concern, the US encouraged tanzanite dealers and wholesalers to sign on to
the Tuscon Tanzanite Protocol so that nefarious persons could not take advantage
of the trade. The US then declared that there was no link between tanzanite and
al-Qaeda. Although a prominent tanzanite dealer in the US who investigated the
issue agreed there was no al-Qaeda connection, others, including Global
Witness, were not convinced.92
The bombing of the embassy in Dar es Salaam resulted in 11 deaths and 85
injuries, most of them Tanzanians. Al-Qaeda operatives involved in the attack
included two Tanzanians from Zanzibar — Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and
Khalfan Khamis Mohammed. South African authorities captured Mohamed and
a US court convicted him in 2001. He is serving a life term in Florence,
Colorado. A joint US-Pakistani raid in Gurjat, Pakistan, netted Ghailani in 2004.
Ghailani told military officers at Guantanamo Bay that he had no idea explosives
he purchased for a friend would be part of a truck bomb to be used against the
US embassy and that he was sorry for what had happened. He claimed not to
have knowingly participated in any terrorist act but admitted joining al-Qaeda
operatives after the bombing and undergoing training in Afghanistan. He also
said he had met bin Laden.93
Subsequent investigations revealed involvement in financing for al-Qaeda
by the Saudi charity, al-Haramain Islamic Foundation in Tanzania. The US
charged its former director with providing funds to plan the attacks against the
embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Saudi Arabia subsequently shut down
al-Haramain worldwide.94
Zanzibar and the Swahili coast of Tanzania are potential hotbeds of radical
Islamic activity and Zanzibar has produced a few al-Qaeda operatives.
Occasional reports surface that al-Qaeda is planning something in Tanzania,
including a 2003 plot against tourist hotels on Zanzibar, but so far there has been
no significant attack since 1998.95
Uganda: Avoiding al-Qaeda Attacks but Walking on the Edge
In 1994, al-Qaeda supported the obscure Salafi Foundation of Uganda,
which led to the Ugandan Mujahedin Freedom Fighters. It eventually evolved
into an anti-Uganda government group known as the Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF). Al-Qaeda helped set up training camps for the ADF, which operated out
of the eastern Congo. Ever since the ADF launched its first attack in Uganda in
1996, the organization has been shrouded in mystery. It disappeared and then
resurfaced, using different tactics designed to overthrow the government of
Uganda and establish a Muslim state based on sharia law. The late ADF chief of
staff once stated that ADF’s leader, Jamil Mukulu, was trained in urban terrorism
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by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Uganda’s minister of internal affairs told parliament
in 2002 that the ADF had ties with al-Qaeda. The Ugandan government said in
the same year that al-Qaeda trained top ADF leaders in Afghanistan.96
In 1998, Ugandan authorities detained 20 suspects linked to al-Qaeda and
believed to be planning an attack against the US embassy in Kampala. Al-Qaeda
reportedly planned to assassinate Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and
another African leader visiting Kampala in 1999. Museveni told a stunned group
of Ugandan Muslims at the end of Ramadan in 2001 that, based on documents
passed to him by the US, al-Qaeda terrorists had targeted Uganda. This remark
may have been linked to information available in George Tenet’s book that the
Egyptian intelligence service provided in 2001. It reported that a senior operative
from Jemaah Islamiya, a Southeast Asian terrorist organization allied with al-
Qaeda, was planning attacks on US and Israeli interests. Four trucks filled with
C-4 explosives had been brought to Kampala and operatives there had been cas-
ing the American embassy. Whatever the facts, Uganda has managed to avoid a
major al-Qaeda attack.97
The arrival of Ugandan peacekeeping forces in Somalia in 2007 may
increase the al-Qaeda threat against Uganda. Several al-Qaeda leaders have pub-
licly threatened Ugandan troops in Somalia. A new Somali insurgent group
called the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations
issued a warning in February that it would use suicide attacks against Ugandan
forces. Another organization called the Brigades of Tawhid Wal Jihad in the Land
of Somalia made a similar threat in March. A roadside bomb did kill four
Ugandan soldiers in mid-May, although no group has taken responsibility.98
CONCLUSION
There has been far more al-Qaeda activity in East Africa and the Horn than
in any other part of sub-Saharan Africa. This is a result of the relative proximity
of fundamentalist Islamic ideology and centers of al-Qaeda support, porous land
and sea borders throughout the region, the fact that most of the countries consti-
tute a religious fault line, serious problems of governance and corruption, social
and economic inequality, widespread poverty, and the marginalization and alien-
ation of Muslim communities in several of the countries. 
Al-Qaeda cells almost certainly exist today in all the countries of East
Africa and the Horn and the al-Qaeda threat may well be increasing. Having said
this, it is important not to accept at face value all al-Qaeda claims or to overstate
the al-Qaeda threat. US policy in the region is so focused on countering terror-
ism over the short-term that it may be failing to deal appropriately with the root
causes and the long-term threat. Following US support early in 2006 for the war-
lord coalition in Mogadishu known as ARPCT, the International Crisis Group
concluded that US counterterrorism efforts designed to contain al-Qaeda opera-
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tives accelerated the expansion of jihadi Islamist forces and produced the largest
potential safe-haven for al-Qaeda in Africa.99 The recent defeat of the Islamic
Courts in Somalia may have disrupted the plans of the jihadists among them, but
in this part of the world political stability is ephemeral and America’s extremist
enemies have their eye on the future. This is a time to pursue long-term solutions
to root causes rather than remain obsessed with short-term tactical victories.   
David H. Shinn served for 37 years in the US Foreign Service at seven
embassies in Africa and one in the Middle East, including as ambassador to
Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He was in charge of East African and Horn of African
affairs in the State Department and is now an adjunct professor in the Elliot
School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. 
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